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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

JAMES H. HUPP,
Petitioner-Appellant,
-vs-

Case No.
16603

HONORABLE S. MARK JOHNSON,
Judge of the Circuit Court,
State of Utah, Davis County,
Bountiful Department,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant petitioned the Second Judicial District
Court for Davis County for an Extraordinary Writ directing
respondent to dismiss a criminal complaint charging
appellant with driving under the influence of intoxicating
liquor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1953),
as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Honorable J. Duffy Palmer, Judge of the Second
Judicial District Court, heard arguments of counsel on the
19th day of July, 1979.

Judge Palmer ruled that the offenses
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with which appellant was charged did not constitute a
single criminal episode, and thus that appellant was
not entitled to the relief prayed for in the petition.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirrnance of the order of
Judge Palmer dismissing the appellant's petition for
an Extraordinary Writ.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant was arrested on the 5th day of
January, 1979, at approximately 1:50 a.m., and was
charged by separate citations with four separate violations of the Motor Vehicle Code:

driving under the influence

of alcohol, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1953),
as amended (all statutory references are to Utah Code Ann.
1953 as amended unless otherwise indicated); operating a
motor vehicle without a valid operator's license, in violatic
of Section 41-2-2; operating a motor vehicle with an expired
Utah State vehicle registration, in violation of Section 41->
and operating a motor vehicle without a valid Utah State safe
inspection sticker, in violation of Section 41-6-158.
Pursuant to the requirements of Section
77-11-6, et seq., appellant appeared in the Circuit Court
of Davis County, Bountiful Department, and pleaded guilty
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1

to operating a motor vehicle without a valid Utah operator's
license, operating a vehicle without a valid Utah safety
inspection sticker, and operating a vehicle without a
valid Utah vehicle registration.

The court accepted these

pleas and sentenced appellant thereupon.

Appellant at

that time entered a plea of not guilty to the charge of
driving under the influence of alcohol and pursuant to
Section 77-11-9, appellant was subsequently charged by a
formal complaint with driving under the influence of
alcohol.
Trial on this charge was had on May 22, 1979.
Appellant appeared through counsel and moved the Court
to dismiss the charge because the prosecution was barred
by the single criminal episode statutes.

The Court denied

this motion, found appellant guilty of the charge, and
set a date for sentencing.

Appellant then filed a

verified petition in the Second Judicial District
Court in and for Davis County.

The petition was denied

and appellant appeals from the denial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLANT'S CONDUCT DID NOT
CONSTITUTE A "SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE"
WITHIN THE MEANING OF UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-1-401 (1953) I AS AMENDED.

-3-
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The concept of "single criminal episode" is
defined in Section 76-1-401 as follows:
In this part unless the context
requires a different definition, "single
criminal episode" means all conduct which
is closely related in time and is incident
to an attempt or an accomplishment of a
single criminal objective.
Respondent concedes that the conduct of appellant giving
rise to the charges against appellant was "closely
related in time."

However, there was no "single criminal

objective" on appellant's behalf to which such conduct
was incident.

The case of State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577

(Utah 1977), sheds significant light on the meaning of
"single criminal objective."

In Cornish, the defendant

was charged with unlawful taking of a motor vehicle and
with failure to stop at the command of a peace officer.
This Court stated, in finding that the conduct did not
constitute a single criminal episode:
Not only were the two ofenses charged
separated in time by approximately one full
day, but they also were separate in objective.
The objective of the unlawful taking was to
obtain possession, be it permanent or
temporary, of another's automobile.
It was
a completed offense at the time the car was
taken.
The objective of the failure to stop
was to avoid arrest for the traffic violations
he had just committed and/or to avoid being
found in a stolen motor vehicle.
571 P.2d 577, 578.
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Respondent submits that in the case at bar it makes no
sense to speak of appellant's "criminal objective"
which his conduct (i.e., driving) was intended to
accomplish.

The offenses with which appellant was

charged are all strict liability offenses, which
require no particular intent or state of mind.

If the

actor commits the forbidden "act" he is guilty under
the statutes.

Such offenses are not aimed at controlling

"criminal objective," but only at controlling prohibited
actions.
In an attempt to bring his case within Section
76-1-401, appellant argues that his "single criminal
objective" was "to perform the act of driving a vehicle
illegally," Appellant's Brief, p. 4.

Common experience

would indicate that even a person who drives a vehicle
without a valid registration, license, or inspection and
while under the influence of alcohol does not necessarily
form a conscious objective to violate the law by so
driving.

Even assuming that one did form this "objective,"

the conduct of becoming intoxicated was not "incident to
an attempt or an accomplishment" of the objective (i.e.,
driving a vehicle illegally).

Appellant's intoxication

was not a necessary precondition to his driving illegally
in the sense that kidnapping may be a necessary incident
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to the accomplishment of robbery.

Thus, appellant's

conduct did not constitute a single criminal episode
as defined in Section 76-1-401.
Appellant's conduct is not the type to which
the single criminal episode statutes are designed to
apply.

In Model Penal Code

§

1.08, Comment (Proposed

Official Draft 1962), the commentator states:
Paragraph (b) requires a single
prosecution for offenses arising out of
conduct engaged in with a common purpose
where the offenses are all necessary or
incidental to the accomplishment of that
purpose.
In many instances one offense is
a necessary step in the accomplishment of a
given criminal objective . . . Fairly
frequent are prosecutions for robbery and
kid.napping where the kidnapping was
necessary to accomplish the robbery.
Given this example, appellant's characterization of
driving illegally as his "single criminal objective"
is unsound and constitutes merely a strained attempt
to bring himself under the protection of the statutes.
POINT II
EVEN IF APPELLANT'S CONDUCT WAS A
"SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE," THE PROCEDURE
FOLLOWED IN THIS CASE DID HOT VIOLATE
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-401, ET SEQ. (1953),
AS AMENDED.
The operative provisions of the single
criminal episode statutes are set out in relevant part
below:
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(1)
A defendant may be prosecuted in
a single criminal action for all separate
offenses arising out of a single criminal
episode; however, when the same act of a
defendant under a single criminal episode
shall establish offenses which may be punished
in different ways under different provisions
of this code, the act shall be punishable
under only one such provision; an acquittal
or conviction and sentence under any such
provision bars a prosecution under any other
such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish
separate offenses under a single criminal
episode, unless the court otherwise orders to
promote justice, a defendant shall not be
subject to separate trials for multiple
offenses when:
(a)
The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court, and
(b)
The offenses are known to the
prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant is arraigned on the first information
or indictment.

(1)
If a defendant has been prosecuted
for one or more offenses arising out of a
single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution
for the same or a different offense arising out
of the same criminal episode is barred if:
(a)
The subsequent prosecution is for an
offense that was or should have been tried under
section 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; and
(b)
The former prosecution:
(i)
Resulted in acquittal; or
(ii) Resulted in conviction; or
(iii)Was improperly terminated; or
(iv) Was terminated by a final order or
judgment for the defendant that has
not been reversed, set aside, or vacated
and that necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact that must be
established to secure conviction in the
subsequent prosecution. .
(3)
There is a conviction if the prosecution
resulted in a judgment of guilt that has not been
reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and
that is capable of supporting a judgment; or a plea
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Sections 76-1-402 and 76-1-403, Utah Code Ann.,
(1953), as amended (emphasis added).

In the case of State v.

Sosa, filed July 5, 1979, No. 15929, this Court wrote:
The single criminal episode
statute is strictly proceduLal in
nature.
It requires that when a defendant
is brought before a court, all offenses
arising from a single incident which
are triable before that court should be
charged at the same time.
If separate
charges can be joined, they should be.
Id. at p. 4.

Respondent submits that in the case at bar,

even if appellant's conduct constitutes a single criminal
episode under § 76-1-401, the above-stated requirement was
met and thus the ruling O·f Judge Palmer should be affirmed.
Under§ 76-1-402(1), if the "same act" of a
defendant may be punished in different ways under different
provisions of the Code, defendant may be punished under only
one such provision.

This subsection does not apply to the

case at bar because the only "act" which is common to each
offense for which appellant was charged is that of operating
a motor vehicle.

This act alone is not prohibited by any

section of the code and thus is not punishable in different
ways.

Only if "act" is defined to include, in addition to

driving, the further acts of being intoxicated, or failing to

:I

a valid driver's license, registration, or vehicle inspectior...
does the provision make sense.

In this light, it was not
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the "same act" of appellant for which he was charged with four
distinct offenses, but rather four distinct "acts" which
constitute four distinct offenses.
Under§ 76-1-402(2), a defendant whose conduct
establishes separate offenses should not, unless the judge
otherwise orders, be subject to separate trials.
provision

This

does not apply to the instant case because

appellant was not subjected to "separate trials."

The

procedure for disposition of citation offenses is set out
in the following sections:
A peace officer, in lieu of taking
a person into custody . . . may issue and
deliver a citation requiring any person
subject to arrest or prosecution on a
misdemeanor charge to appear at the
court of the magistrate before whom the
person could be taken pursuant to law if
the person had been arrested.
§

77-11-6

(emphasis added); and:
(1)
Whenever a citation is issued
pursuant to the provisions of section
77-11-6, the copy of the citation filed
with the magistrate may be used in lieu
of a complaint to which the person cited
may plead guilty or on which bail may be
posted and forfeited.
(2)
If the person cited wilfully
fails to appear before a magistrate
pursuant to a citation issued under
section 77-11-6 or pleads not guilty to
the offense charged . . . a complaint

-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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shall be filed and proceedings
held in accordance with the Rules of
Criminal Procedure
§

77-11-9

(emphasis added) .

The procedure set forth above

was strictly followed in this case.

Appellant pleaded

guil~

to the three violations of driving without a license,
registration, or vehicle inspection and entered a plea of
not guilty to the charge of driving under the influence of
intoxicating liquor.

A complaint was then filed and a time

set for the trial of the charge to which appellant pleaded
not guilty.

This procedure did not constitute two

"separa~

trials," but rather a series of events leading to one trial
on the driving under the influence charge.

To hold otherwise

would create a conflict between § 77-11-9 and the single
criminal episode statutes since any time a defendant was
charged with multiple citation offenses he could plead

guil~

to one or more offenses and not guilty to the others and avoic /I
subsequent proceedings on those charges to which he pleaded
not guilty by arguing the statutory bar of § 76-1-402.
Section 76-1-403(1) bars a subsequent prosecution
for offenses which were or should have been

(under § 76-1-402

prosecuted in a former prosecution.

For the reasons stated

above, it makes no sense to speak of

(1)

guilty pleas on some charges, and

( 2)

the accepting of

the trial of other chacc-.

to which appellant pleaded not guilty, as separate "prosecut~
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(

I

The procedure set forth in

§

77-11-9, infra, is, when followed,

only one prosecution leading to one trial.

Thus, § 76-1-403

does not apply here.
Finally, appellant suggests that the judge should
not have accepted appellant's pleas of not guilty until after
the trial on the charge of driving under the influence.

The

danger in this contention is shown by the following illustration.
Most citation offenses are disposed of by the defendant's
mailing the appropriate fine directly to the Circuit Court
Clerk's Office.

Such a procedure is equivalent to a plea of

guilty to the offense charged which is automatically accepted
by the court.

The fine

the bail schedule.

(sentence) is pre-set according to

If appellant had chosen to mail the

fines for the three offenses to which he pleaded guilty and
then appear to plead not guilty to driving under the influence,
he would, under the theory he advances here, not be subject
to prosecution on the latter charge.

This result would follow

even though no judge had accepted appellant's guilty pleas.
This shows that appellant's argument that his case fits within
the single criminal episode statutes is unfounded.

-11-
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I

CONCLUSION

f

Respondent submits that the order dismissing

I
I

petitioner's petition for an Extraordinary Writ be affirmed
for the following reasons.

I

First, where as here, a defendant

is charged by citation with multiple violations of the Utah
Code and where each of the offenses is a "strict-liability"

j

crime, the single criminal episode statutes do not apply
because there is no "single criminal episode" as that phrase
is intended.

Second, even if conduct such as appellant's

constitutes a "single criminal episode," the words "same act"
under

§

76-1-402 must be interpreted to include not merely

the act of driving, but also the acts or omissions of
becoming intoxicated, and failing to obtain a valid driver's
license, registration, or vehicle inspection.

Appellant

committed four separate "acts" punishable in If our different
ways under the Code.

I

Finally, the procedure following in cases such as
this does not subject a defendant to multiple prosecutions
for charges which could have been disposed of in one

prosecuti~

Rather, the acceptance of guilty pleas on some charges and
subsequent trial on other charges to which the defendant
pleaded not guilty constitutes one prosecution within the
mandate of § 76-1-403.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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